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Abstract 
In this paper, we analyzed key aspects of the changing economic relationship between the 
European Union (EU) and Asia, and explored the potential economic ramifications of deeper 
EU-Asian economic cooperation. We also investigated the possible costs to the EU of 
remaining “disengaged” from the Asian integration process and the likely impact of multi-
nested EU-Asian trade agreements. Our empirical review of CGE models revealed trivial 
effects of several possible EU-Asian accords (e.g., EU-India, EU-ASEAN, EU-Republic of 
Korea). In part, this is a result of relatively small trade shares, open markets, and restrictions 
in the models, particularly in that they excluded behind-the-border effects. We also 
presented two CGE models that estimated the potential negative effects of Asian/Asia-
Pacific regional accords on the EU, and likewise found small effects. Nevertheless, using a 
highly-disaggregated (partial-equilibrium) approach, we argued that high-quality FTAs in 
Asia could be quite detrimental to the EU, particularly in key sectors. The push toward a 
Free Trade Area of the Asia Pacific could be particularly worrisome to the EU. We therefore 
concluded that it makes sense for the EU to be more aggressive in pursuing prospective 
trade agreements with Asia. 
JEL Classification: F13, F15 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
Asian economic integration has been proceeding at a vigorous pace in recent years. The 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has essentially completed its regional free-
trade area (AFTA) and has now committed itself to a single market and production base in 
the form of the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) by 2015. It has also set in place free-
trade areas (FTAs) with several countries, including Australia, India, Japan, New Zealand, 
People’s Republic of China (PRC), and Republic of Korea (hereafter Korea). Singapore has 
many bilateral FTAs, including its “model” P4 FTA with Brunei, New Zealand, and Chile, 
which has attracted considerable interest from the United States (US). Japan and Korea 
have several other FTAs currently being implemented or negotiated. In addition, significant 
financial arrangements have been established in the region, such as the Asian Bond Pool, 
the Chiang Mai Agreement, and the Executive Meeting of East Asian and Pacific Central 
Banks. At the 7
th Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) in October 2008, the ASEAN+3 (i.e., ASEAN, 
Japan, Korea and PRC) stipulated their intention to form an US$80 billion liquidity fund to 
deal with the global financial crisis that began in September 2008. Considering that none of 
these agreements were evident a decade ago—with the exception of a partially-implemented 
AFTA—we can easily conclude that the region has been a recent and active member of the 
emerging FTA club.   
But the regionalism movement in Asia has not been limited to regional economies. In fact, 
there are more inter-regional accords made by Asian economies than there are intra-
regional ones (ADB 2008). The US, for example, has an FTA with Singapore and has signed 
(though not ratified) one with Korea. Aside from its “Bilateral Trade Agreement” with Viet 
Nam and Laos, it also has two relatively advanced pacts with Thailand and Malaysia that are 
currently on hold, with views to expand to other ASEAN countries under the Enterprise for 
ASEAN Initiative. The US is likewise pushing for a “Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific” 
(FTAAP), an idea which was supported at the November 2008 APEC Summit in Lima, Peru. 
It is curious then that the European Union (EU), which is considered the “mother of all 
regionalism,” has been conspicuously absent from the Asian FTA scenario. The EU has 
discussed a possible FTA pact with ASEAN but is a long way from finalizing it. It has 
considered accords with Korea and PRC, but nothing has come of them. The biannual 
ASEM is mainly a vehicle to discuss general issues, not economic cooperation per se.   
Now, the EU has been occupied with many other pressing issues, including the expansion of 
its membership, its “Neighborhood Policy” with European non-members, the complicated 
nature of the accession of Turkey, the “Economic Partnership Agreements” (EPAs) with 
former colonies of its member states (replacing the former Lomé agreements), and the 
World Trade Organization (WTO) Doha Development Agenda negotiations, which is not an 
easy task given the competing interests in the EU27. All of these have salient political and 
economic dimensions. 
Still, there are costs associated with remaining complacent as Asian FTAs continue to rise in 
importance. Moreover, most Asian countries are generally excluded from the so-called 
European “Pyramid of Preferences”, under which the EU conducts over three-fourths of its 
trade. Such a disadvantage is costly as the EU is the largest single market in the world, with 
a diverse mix of mature developed countries and dynamic emerging markets.   
The purpose of this paper is to look at the economics associated with this lack of formal 
integration across the Eurasian continent. We approached this question from several angles, 
but focusing on the economics of the issue—we only included political questions on a “need 
to know” basis. The paper begins with a statistical review of the EU-Asian economic 
relationship. Section III considers the economic implications of potential Asian integration 
accords for the EU, as well as potential EU-Asia agreements. We then summarized relevant 
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Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) models which have estimated the effects of various 
configurations of Asian regionalism. We also used our own disaggregated approach in order 
to uncover key EU exports that could face potential trade and investment diversion. Section 
IV presents our conclusion.   
2.  THE EU-ASIAN ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIP 
Asia continues to be the most dynamic region in the world. By any measure, Asian economic 
growth and development since the 1990s have been remarkable, particularly in East Asia.  
Two relevant features of this growth are discussed below.  
First, the internationalization of Asian economies has been in many ways phenomenal. The 
ASEAN transitional economies have essentially been transformed from autarky to 
considerably open economies over the past two decades of reform. Viet Nam, for example, 
saw its share of exports (imports) as a percentage of GDP rise from 7% (17%) to 66% (74%) 
over the 1985 to 2004 period, that is, even before it joined the WTO in 2007. Other countries 
also registered impressive changes, with the two Asian giants of India and PRC significantly 
expanding their shares of exports and imports in GDP, as well as their global presence.  
Economic liberalization, particularly of commercial policies, has been behind this 
internationalization of developing Asian economies, and there has generally been a strong 
correlation between measures of interaction with the global economy (e.g., through rising 
shares of trade) and economic prosperity. The opening up of transitional ASEAN economies, 
PRC, and India has paid the greatest dividends and offers the most dynamic markets for a 
developed region like the EU.   
Second, there is strong empirical support for the rise of an “Asian economy” based on 
multinational corporation network-building, using the diversity of the region to create a 
vertical division of labor that reaps greater efficiencies through fragmented trade. For 
example, Rana (2006) uses a gravity model to show that there has been a rise in economic 
symmetry that derives from an increase in intra-regional trade, which in turn is being led by 
rising intra-industry trade. In other words, the post-crisis Asian economy has become more 
close-knit through a process of vertically-integrated production networks and fragmented 
trade. If there is one overriding economic goal for Asian regionalism, it is arguably to 
facilitate this process. Hence, Asian regionalism is being designed to encourage 
multinational investments and open up regional markets, by creating a healthy atmosphere 
for international trade and investment (ADB 2008). Asian regionalism today is the opposite of 
“Fortress Asia.”   
Thus, Europe finds a dynamic, increasingly-open region in Asia which, through its FTAs, 
demonstrates a revealed preference to bring down barriers to global economic interchange. 
This is certainly the kind of region the EU would want to do business with. Or is it doing 
enough business without formal regional agreements? Below, we look more in-depth at the 
EU-Asian economic relationship.   
2.1  Direction of Trade 
Both the EU and Asia have been key players in the growth of international trade. Taken as a 
region, the EU is by far the largest global trader. It has expanded from six Western European 
countries in 1957 to 27 countries, with the most recent member-states, Bulgaria and 
Romania, joining in 2007. More are in the process of accession negotiations, in sizes 
ranging from Macedonia to Turkey. Its economy is larger than that of the United States. 
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Two-thirds of the EU’s international trade is intra-regional, which has increased from 61% in 
1990 to 66% in 2006 (Figure 1).
1 Nevertheless, the share of ASEAN and PRC has also been 
on the rise, with PRC in particular intensifying its interaction with the EU. Japan’s share of 
EU exports has fallen in half to only 2% and imports to even less than that.   
Figure 1:  Direction of EU Exports, 2006 
 



















Notes: ASEAN = Association of Southeast Asian Nations, EU = European Union, Korea = Republic of Korea, PRC = 
People’s Republic of China, ROW = Rest of the world, US = United States   
Sources:  UN COMTRADE database; UNCTAD Handbook of Statistics. 
The share of the EU in Asian trade is greater, given its size in the global economy and the 
role of EU multinationals in the region. The EU accounted for 16% of Asia’s exports in 2006 
(Figure 2), lesser than the US (18%) but greater than Japan and Korea combined. This is a 
slight increase from 1990, in stark contrast to the US whose share has declined precipitously 
from 25%.
2   
                                                  
1 UN COMTRADE database. 
2 Ibid. 
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Notes:  ASEAN = Association of Southeast Asian Nations, EU = European Union, Korea = Republic of Korea, PRC = 
People’s Republic of China, ROW = Rest of the world, US = United States; Direction of trade data unavailable for 
Asia-Taipei,China. 
Sources:  UN COMTRADE database; UNCTAD Handbook of Statistics. 
2.2  Sectoral Trade Flows 
Table 1 shows the composition of EU-Asian exports in 2006, using the sectoral composition 
of world trade as a benchmark. As expected, the “machinery and equipment” category is the 
most important component of EU exports to Asia in all markets. The share of this sector in 
EU exports to Asian countries is higher (sometimes significantly so) than its share in world 
trade, with the exceptions of Japan and (marginally) India. “Other manufactures” and 
“chemicals” are the other key EU exports to Asia. 
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Table 1:  Direction of EU Exports to Major Asian Markets by Sector, 2006 
(1-digit SITC) 
Product Category  Major Asian Markets for EU Exports  
(as percentage of total exports) 
  World  ASEAN  PRC  India  Japan  Korea 
Food and live animals chiefly for food  3.37   2.88   0.97   0.84   5.38   2.93  
Beverages and tobacco  1.55   1.65   0.41   0.25   2.77   1.32  
Crude materials, inedible, except 
fuels  2.15   1.80   7.55   3.66   3.21   2.67  
Mineral fuels, lubricants and related 
materials  4.87   2.40   0.39   0.80   0.34   0.22  
Animal and vegetable oils, fats and 
waxes  0.22   0.09   0.05   0.05   0.35   0.36  
Chemicals and related products, nes  14.66   12.58   8.49   8.37   20.01   15.35  
Manufactured goods classified chiefly 
by materials  14.58   11.47   13.02   34.19   9.79   11.95  
Machinery and transport equipment  42.73   54.97   58.82   41.63   34.67   44.21  
Miscellaneous manufactured articles  11.39   8.50   6.33   6.66   20.13   17.13  
Commodities and transactions not 
classified elsewhere  4.49   3.67   3.98   3.54   3.34   3.87  
Total (US$ Billion)  1534.26   60.55   79.29   30.23   55.26   28.32  
            
 
Notes:  ASEAN = Association of Southeast Asian Nations, Korea = Republic of Korea, PRC = People’s Republic of 
China, SITC = Standard International Trade Classification. 
Source: UN COMTRADE database. 
Table 2 shows that Asian exports to the EU are also dominated by “machinery and 
equipment.” This reflects in part the role of EU multinationals in Asian trade, with this sector 
picking up a good deal of the trade in components. The other major sector is “miscellaneous 
manufactures,” followed by “other manufactures.” “Chemicals” are fairly insignificant in Asian 
exports to the EU; its share is less than that of Asian world trade. 
A few general conclusions can be gleaned from these data. First, the EU remains a major 
trading partner for Asia, and its share of Asian exports has been rising despite the large 
increase in intra-Asian trade. Meanwhile, Asia’s share in EU’s trade has also been growing, 
albeit lesser than the EU’s share of Asian trade. Second, the composition of EU-Asian trade 
is consistent with a mature relationship based on production networking and increasing intra-
industry trade. 
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Table 2: Direction of Asian Exports to Major Markets by Sector, 2006 
(1 digit SITC) 
Major Markets for Asian Exports (as percentage of total exports) 
Product  
Category   World ASEAN  PRC  HKG  IND  JPN  KOR  EU  US  ROW 
Food and live 
animals chiefly 
for food 
2.64   2.78   1.14  1.32  0.74  6.86  3.06   2.27   2.08  3.09 
Beverages and 








6.16   12.43   6.29  4.20 13.45 13.88 10.88   1.28   1.75  6.41 
Animal and 
vegetable oils, 
fats and waxes 





















elsewhere in the 
SITC 




96   380.20   236.80  263.72  43.19  203.89  125.62   457.60   518.97  595.98 
      
Notes: ASEAN = Association of Southeast Asian Nations, EU = European Union, HKG = Hong Kong, China,IND = 
India, JPN = Japan, Korea = Republic of Korea, PRC = People’s Republic of China, ROW = Rest of the world, SITC = 
Standard International Trade Classification, US = United States.   
Source: UN COMTRADE database 
We looked more carefully at disaggregated data to identify the most significant EU exports to 
Asia in Section IV. As a final exercise, we considered the pattern of EU’s trade with Asian 
countries, both relative to each other and in a global context. This approach gave us some 
intuitive information about the “normalcy” of EU exports to the region. We used the 
Spearman Rank Correlation Coefficient technique, which correlates the ranking of two series 
(in this case, the structure of EU exports to various markets). Its domain is –1 (perfect 
negative correlation) to +1 (perfect correlation). As this approach has a clear upward bias, 
we used highly disaggregated data (HS 6-digit) in the correlations, yielding between 3,000 
and 4,000 observations for 2007. In doing this, we were able to correlate EU exports to each 
Asian market and the world. The results are presented in Table 3. 
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The correlations of EU exports to Asian economies and the world tend to be above 0.7, with 
the exceptions of India (0.66) and Viet Nam (0.6). Given that 1.0 would be a perfect 
correlation, these are moderately high estimates. Exports to Singapore (0.75) are the most 
consistent with overall EU exports. In addition, there seems to be considerable variance in 
EU exports to various Asian economies, with exports to Viet Nam and Japan (0.42) and Viet 
Nam and Singapore (0.48) being the most dissimilar.  
Table 3: Correlations of EU Exports to Asian Economies 
(Spearman Rank Correlation Coefficients) 
Country PRC  INO  JPN  KOR  MAL  PHI  IND SIN  VIE  THA 
PRC  1                 
Indonesia  0.658  1             
Japan  0.6223  0.494 1           
Korea  0.7515  0.588 0.728 1         
Malaysia  0.6834  0.673 0.569 0.6569 1       
Philippines  0.5839  0.593 0.51 0.5843 0.6245 1     
India  0.7828  0.664 0.539 0.6641 0.6693 0.541 1   
Singapore 0.6838  0.583 0.622 0.6888 0.7042 0.585 0.6 1     
Viet Nam  0.5996  0.606 0.421 0.5214 0.5555 0.555 0.6 0.48 1   
Thailand 0.7237  0.695 0.594 0.6682 0.7023 0.639 0.7 0.64 0.63  1
World 0.774  0.661 0.731 0.772 0.7326 0.63 0.7 0.75 0.6  0.722
Notes:  IND = India, INO = Indonesia, JPN = Japan, Korea = Republic of Korea, MAL = Malaysia, PHI = Philippines, 
SIN = Singapore, PRC = People’s Republic of China, THA = Thailand, VIE = Viet Nam; All observations are included 
if data are recorded for both countries. All coefficients are statistically significant at 99% level of confidence. 
2.3  Foreign Direct Investment 
Foreign direct investment (FDI) is another important expression of economic interaction. 
Indeed, the two are closely linked.
3 All bilateral FTAs between Asian and Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries include investment provisions. 
Some of these provisions, like those of the Singapore-US FTA, are quite extensive, even 
including Mode 3 services. The ASEAN Comprehensive Investment Area (ACIA), which is 
slated to be launched at the end of 2008 as part of the AEC project, emphasizes national 
treatment, liberalization, and best practices. FDI will no doubt be a priority in any Asia-EU 
FTA. In fact, while Europeans have had a hard time negotiating investment provisions in 
their EPAs with former colonies and at the WTO
4, they will likely have much less difficulty in 
doing this with Asian partners. For example, the ASEAN Investment Area, which precedes 
the ACIA, actually has a provision for extending national treatment to non-partner investors 
by 2020.
5 This is no coincidence given the importance of non-partners as sources of FDI.   
Table 4 shows EU investment in all ASEAN countries over the period 1995-2006. The EU 
clearly is the most important foreign investor in ASEAN over this period, with US$101 billion 
in cumulative investments, which is almost as much as that of the US and Japan put 
together and three times of intra-ASEAN FDI. As in the case of other OECD countries, 
Singapore receives the lion’s share of EU’s investment, followed by Malaysia and Thailand. 
The UK and the Netherlands are the most important EU investors in the region. 
                                                  
3 See, for example, ADB (2008), Chapter 3. 
4 One reason for the failure of the WTO Cancun Ministerial in 2003 was related to the EU’s push for investment 
provisions in the Doha Development Agenda discussions. 
5 The date was 2010 for partner countries. 
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Table 4: FDI Flows to ASEAN Countries by Source, 1995-2006 
(US$ Million) 
Host Country  FDI  
Source  BRU INO LAO MAL  MYA  PHI SIN THA  VIE  Total 
        
Japan  414   3,369   20  8,936  120  3,243  16,301   20,099   2,765  55,266 
US  90   1,972   6  13,643  406  3,461  23,303   6,397   915  50,192 
Canada  14   113   3  378  62  8  1,232   518   48  2,376 
EU  6,990   7,823   189  11,427  1,887  1,795  58,294   9,809   3,737  101,951 
France  139   983   167  355  729  276  2,805   763   1,084  7,301 
Germany  20   1,210   1  4,187  9  -291  -684   2,060   82  6,594 
Netherlands  2,637   4,308   0  1,642  8  627  20,218   453   1,519  31,412 
UK  4,178   1,238   9  3,741  1,137  847  29,554   5,270   864  46,837 
PRC  8   873   42  114  197  306  967   46   294  2,847 
ANIEs  77   1,240   124  2,818  302  1,152  7,050   5,636   5,481  23,881 
 Korea  39   1,040   111  196  56  245  1,092   500   1,785  5,065 
Hong Kong, 
China  33   162   2  1,895  247  699  1,693   3,638   1,476  9,844 
Taipei,China  5   38   10  728  0  207  4,265   1,497   2,220  8,972 
ASEAN  1,429   4,428   281  9,030  1,051  1,247  9,401   7,778   3,254  37,900 
Brunei 
Darussalam    -28   0  298  0  0  218   11   3  502 
Cambodia  0   0   0  3  0  0  6   18   1  28 
Indonesia  57     0  280  41  39  4,092   54   61  4,625 
Lao PDR  0   0   0  0  0  1   -1   12  12 
Malaysia  240   1,344   97  57  88  4,536   470   612  7,445 
Myanmar  0   0   0  0  0  100   3   0  104 
Philippines  5   13   0  97  4  273   234   49  675 
Singapore  1,119   2,955   6  8,097  750  1,116    6,983   2,000  23,026 
Thailand  8   144   168  215  198  4  142     517  1,396 
Viet Nam  0   0   9  38  0  0  33   6   86 
        
Notes: ANIEs = Asian Newly Industrializing Economies, ASEAN = Association of Southeast Asian Nations, BRU = 
Brunei Darussalam, EU = European Union, INO = Indonesia, Korea = Republic of Korea, LAO = Lao People’s 
Democratic Republic, MAL = Malaysia, MYA = Myanmar, PHI = Philippines, PRC = People’s Republic of China, SIN 
= Singapore, THA = Thailand, UK = United Kingdom, US = United States, VIE = Vietnam. 
Source: UN COMTRADE database. 
3.  EMPIRICAL ESTIMATES 
As EU integration has such a long history, any effects on Asia have mainly already been 
absorbed.
6 The EU’s integration of Bulgaria and Romania in 2007 should have a negligible 
impact on Asia given their small size and the fact that they have been implementing 
accession-related measures since 1997. Investment diversion may happen, but it will no 
doubt be small. And Asia could well find new markets in newly-acceding countries. The 
EPAs should also have little effect, particularly since majority of these countries already have 
duty-free access to the EU market through the “everything but arms” initiative. True, the 
EPAs will be reciprocal, but African markets are insignificant for most Asian economies, 
                                                  
6 For a review and assessment of the effects of the Single Market Progamme on Asia, see Kreinin and Plummer 
(2002). 
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except for imports of natural resources. Hence, to the extent that EU integration has affected 
Asia, the ramifications should already be evident. But what would be the effect of Asian 
regionalism on the EU? And what would be the effects of potential EU accords with Asian 
countries?  
We answer these questions from two perspectives. First, we reviewed the CGE literature 
and surveyed the potential effects of EU-Asian accords and the implications of various 
configurations of Asian arrangements on the EU. Second, we used a disaggregated 
technique to capture the most important products that will likely face trade diversion in the 
event of an Asian FTA or subgroups thereof. We argue that these will be important from the 
political-economy perspective.  
Before starting, we should be explicit about what we mean by “Asian regionalism.” What will 
be the optimal configuration of Asian countries? In general, wider FTA arrangements in Asia 
are expected to be better than smaller ones, as suggested by the theory of preferential trade 
agreements and underscored in such studies as Kawai and Wignaraja (2008). They 
suggested that an Asia-wide FTA would be ideal from an economic point of view, but 
considering the strategic and political importance of the US in Asia, perhaps an East 
Asia+NAFTA accord, or even the FTAAP, would be best. In fact, the prospects of an Asia-
wide FTA without the participation of the United States are quite small due to political 
constraints.   
To date, there is no accord between Northeast Asian countries, which constitute the “+3” of 
the ASEAN+3. The reasons are basically political. The result has been a series of bilateral 
arrangements, as well as “ASEAN+1” accords. Nevertheless, these political constraints may 
be loosening up. Plummer and Wignaraja (2007) noted that the FTA movement may improve 
political and economic relationships throughout the region, subsequently reducing political 
obstacles to regional integration endogenously.  
Nevertheless, an Asia-wide FTA is probably a medium-term prospect. In the short-run, we 
will likely see the continuation of bilateral and multilateral arrangements, with both regional 
and extra-regional partners. To the extent that the EU remains outside this web, it could 
potentially suffer from trade and investment diversions, as well as non-traditional costs.  
What would be the optimal size of an EU-Asia FTA? Certainly, the ASEM group would be a 
candidate. It has been in existence for 12 years and, after the accessions of Bulgaria, India, 
Mongolia, Pakistan, Romania and the ASEAN Secretariat in 2008, it now has 45 partners.
7 
However, while economic cooperation issues are discussed in ASEM every two years, its 
accomplishments have been minimal. It is not a negotiating forum, and the diversity of 
membership would make an ASEM-FTA difficult to envision. Even if it were to be 
considered, the diversity of economic interests in the group would lead to a shallow accord 
that is based on a “lowest common denominator” approach. In fact, even the ASEAN+1 
arrangements (from the ASEAN-PRC accord to the agreements signed in 2008, e.g., 
ASEAN-India, and ASEAN-Australia/New Zealand) seem to be soft in terms of product and 
sectoral coverage.   
The EU has already had several meetings with its ASEAN counterparts to set the agenda for 
a possible EU-ASEAN accord. This will be difficult to accomplish in the short-run due to 
political issues (e.g., Myanmar, uncertainties in Thailand and Malaysia). Deep integration will 
be very challenging, as has been the case for the Malaysia-US and Thailand-US 
negotiations. The EU has also studied the possibility of a bilateral FTA with PRC, but this is 
a highly-charged issue in the EU (as well as in the United States). In short, the EU faces a 
variety of complications in negotiating FTAs with Asia, but we believe that the most probable 
outcome will be a series of bilateral FTAs with “path-finding” countries. Such a proliferation 
of bilateral FTAs has the usual “spaghetti-bowl” costs, which is why we note in our last 
section that EU accords with Asian countries need to be firmly grounded in the WTO and 
                                                  
7 In addition to the new six, this would include the EU25, ASEAN10, PRC, Japan, and Korea.   
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embrace best practices, instead of just basing them on minimum standards to pass the 
WTO’s Article XXIV criteria.  
3.1  Estimates of Various Configurations of EU-Asia Accords: CGE 
Models 
There are several CGE studies that have estimated the potential ex-ante effects of various 
EU-Asian accords. Francois (2007) estimated the effects of a few potential scenarios in the 
case of an EU- Korea agreement. He set up three possible scenarios, varying from a “soft” 
(partial) agreement to a full FTA. The intermediate case included a full reduction of 
manufacturing tariffs, a 50% reduction in barriers to trade in services, and a 40% reduction in 
agricultural protection without trade facilitation. Most of the gains in all scenarios were 
derived from liberalization of trade in services. The welfare effect of this scenario would be 
an increase of €2.2 billion (0.03% of GDP) and €4.3 (1.01% of GDP) for the EU and Korea, 
respectively. The full FTA scenario would essentially double the gains to the EU and 
increase gains to Korea by 2.5 times. However, the aggregate numbers are projected to 
remain low.   
CEPII (2006) also used a CGE model to estimate the potential effects of an ASEAN-EU 
FTA. It is a standard GTAP-based model, but includes FDI and services. Once again, the 
bulk of the gains accrue due to the liberalization of services, whose barriers are assumed to 
fall by 50%. But the welfare effects of the ASEAN-EU FTA are quite low: ASEAN’s welfare 
rises by 2% of GDP relative to the baseline, while the EU gains a mere 0.1%.   
Decreux and Mitaritonna (2007) simulated an India-EU agreement. This is a particularly 
challenging case, for EU’s trade with India is small at about 0.4% of GDP. From the start, it 
is difficult to envision how the agreement could have a significant effect on GDP. Indeed, in 
the most extensive liberalization case involving a 25% reduction in protection of services, the 
net effect is 0.04% and 0.028% for India and the EU, respectively. 
3.2  Estimates of Effects of Asian Regionalism on the EU: CGE 
Models 
A number of CGE studies have estimated the possible effects of Asian regional integration 
on the EU. The results of two of these are summarized below. 
Plummer and Wignaraja (2007) simulated three possible scenarios, namely,  (1) a 
“fragmentation scenario,” which projects the current wave of bilateralism in East Asia; (2) an 
ASEAN+3 scenario; and (3) an Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) scenario. A four-
scenario, global free trade, was used as a benchmark.   
Table 5 presents the welfare effects, expressed in terms of percentage of GDP (on an 
equivalent variation basis). 
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Table 5: Impact of Four Commercial Policy Scenarios  














ASEAN 1.72  2.02  1.62  2.20 
Northeast Asia  -0.02  0.37  0.96  1.23 
Rest of Asia  -0.01  -0.06  -0.22  0.61 
US -0.01  -0.02  0.12  0.24 
Europe -0.01  -0.01  -0.04  0.30 
ROW -0.01  -0.01  0.01  0.34 
World 0.01  0.09  0.25  0.51 
Notes: APEC = Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, ASEAN = Association of Southeast Asian Nations, ASEAN+3 = 
ASEAN plus Japan, Korea, and PRC, FTA = free trade area, FTAAP = Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific, GDP = 
gross domestic product, ROW = Rest of the world, US = United States. 
Source:  Plummer and Wignaraja (2007).  Simulations ran by ADB Staff using GEMAT. 
Once again, the net effects were found to be small, particularly so given that this model 
excluded FDI, productivity spillovers, and trade facilitation estimates. However, it is 
interesting that the worst-case scenario for the EU would be the FTAA, which would include 
North America. Trade diversion comes to only 0.4% of GDP, but this is four times the effect 
in other scenarios.   
These results were echoed in Lee and van der Mensbrugghe (2008), who also included four 
scenarios differentiated by their commercial policy assumptions, as follows: 
Scenario 1:  FTA in all goods except rice over 2008-2015 (no change in productivity). 
Scenario 2:  Scenario 1 plus a 2.5% reduction in administrative and technical barriers. 
Scenario 3:  Scenario 2 with endogenous productivity related to openness. 
Scenario 4:  Scenario 3 plus a 20% reduction in trade and transport margin. 
They also included two possible FTAs:  ASEAN+3 and ASEAN+6 (adding India, Australia 
and New Zealand). The results are summarized in Table 6. 
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Table 6: Welfare Effects of ASEAN+6 and ASEAN+3 FTAs 
(% Changes) 
Scenarios Scenario  1  Scenario 2  Scenario 3  Scenario 4 
       
A.  ASEAN+3       
PRC    0.9 0.76 2.58  4.68 
Japan    0.13 0.32 0.35  0.77 
Korea  0.74 1.40 1.64  3.05 
ASEAN  0.32 1.69 1.71  4.81 
India  -0.7 -0.10 -0.09  -0.14 
US  -0.02 -0.03 -0.02  -0.02 
EU-15      -0.02  -0.03  -0.01  -0.01 
New EU members  -0.01  -0.01  -0.00  0.03 
East Asia    0.17  0.65  1.21  2.46 
World  0.03 0.13 0.26  0.55 
       
B.  ASEAN+6       
PRC      0.43 0.70 2.42  4.51 
Japan  0.21 0.30 0.31  0.79 
Korea      1.06 1.32 1.55  3.00 
ASEAN    1.45 1.95 2.01    5.32 
India     -0.34  -0.03  0.73  1.56 
US      -0.03 -0.03 -0.03  -0.02 
EU-15     -0.03  -0.04  -0.02  -0.02 
New EU member   -0.01  -0.02  -0.01  0.04 
East  Asia    0.45 0.64 1.17  2.47 
World     0.09  0.15 0.28  0.62 
       
Notes: ASEAN = Association of Southeast Asian Nations, ASEAN+3 = ASEAN plus Japan, Korea, and PRC, 
ASEAN+6 = ASEAN plus Australia, India, Japan, Korea, New Zealand, and PRC, EU = European Union, FTA = free 
trade area, Korea = Republic of Korea, PRC = People’s Republic of China, US = United States. 
Source: Lee and van der Mensbrugghe (2008). 
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The net trade diversion effect on the EU was small, and inclusion of endogenous productivity 
and trade facilitation actually reduced the costs to the EU (even leading to positive gains to 
the new EU members in Scenario 4). The differences between the ASEAN+3 and ASEAN+6 
accords were actually quite trivial, with the ASEAN+3 being preferred to ASEAN+6 in all 
scenarios and configurations of partners except ASEAN+6 for new EU members.  
3.3  The Costs of Disengagement: A Disaggregated Approach  
Most CGE studies noted the limitations of their models, stressing their inability to effectively 
capture many of the dynamic effects associated with regional integration. This becomes 
increasingly problematic with high-quality FTAs, which focus much more on behind-the-
border measures rather than traditional ones (e.g., tariffs alone). The models do a better job 
of identifying such things as structural change and relative changes in factor returns for the 
integrating countries as opposed to realistic estimates of welfare change.   
Caveats notwithstanding, the CGE results do not present a pressing case to the EU27 in 
terms of the potential costs associated with staying outside the Asian integration process. In 
fact, expressing these changes in terms of GDP might be misleading: GDP signifies the 
value of goods and services produced in the entire economy over one year, and net changes 
are focused on trade alone. Coupled with the fact that Asian trade constitutes only about 
10% of total EU trade, it would be difficult to envision a priori that these numbers could be 
high. Nevertheless, in absolute value the worst-case scenario losses in terms of trade 
diversion in the above studies are not frightening:  Scenario 2 of the ASEAN+6 estimates by 
Lee and van der Mensbrugghe (2008) yielded the most trade diversion, and this estimate 
amounted to only US$2.62 billion (2001 prices), hardly something to provoke a spirited 
response by policymakers governing an economy of US$11 trillion.  
Still, sectoral effects may be important. In other words, if the bulk of the expected trade 
diversion effects were to fall on a few select sectors, the political-economy implications could 
be significant. A problem with CGE modeling is that much of the sectoral details are still 
relatively aggregated (e.g., 22 sectors in the Lee and van der Mensbrugghe calculations), 
whereas trade policy emanates from considerations at a much disaggregated level. Hence, it 
would behoove us also to consider EU exports at the product level and match these against 
existing protection. In this section, we focus on data at the HS 6-digit (HS6) level. 
Specifically, we considered EU27 exports to major countries in Asia and for which we have 
appropriate 2007 data. Fortunately, this included almost the entire sample:  we only exclude 
Brunei and the ASEAN CLMV countries (Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Viet Nam). The 
only significant country (in terms of size) among this group is Viet Nam, for which protection 
information at this level is not available. In 2007, EU27 exports to Viet Nam amounted to 
US$4.4 billion, which is only 1.5% of total Asian exports included in the sample for that year 
(US$291 billion).  
Arranging the data in an understandable way is difficult. Even using a cut-off of US$1 million, 
we found out that in 2007, EU27 engaged in exports classified under 4,787 commodity lines 
at the HS6 level. Applying this to all Asian integrating countries would yield 14,329 entries, 
which is cumbersome, to say the least. Hence, in Appendix Table A.1, we limited ourselves 
to showing the top 50 HS6 exports to each Asian market. The total value of these exports 
amounted to US$89 billion, or about one-third of total Asian exports in the sample. Further, 
in order to focus on salient EU27 HS6 exports, we included in Table 6 all commodities 
exceeding US$1 billion, coming to US$51 billion (or 57% of the commodities included in 
Table A.1). Our data for EU27 exports and tariff mainly came from UN COMTRADE and the 
WTO, respectively.8  
                                                  
8 The WTO tariff database for HS6 products excludes a number of products, particularly for the ASEAN countries.  
We did our best to find some of these data in various sources, including Naya and Plummer (2005), which 
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Our hypothesis is that if the EU27 were excluded from the process, Asian integration will 
cause trade diversion in sectors where protection of individual Asian markets is significant, 
assuming that there is competition in any given Asian market from integrating competitors. 
Given the size and diversity of the Asian integration process—and the fact that the US is 
actively linking into it—competition is pretty much guaranteed, though the elasticity of 
substitution is obviously critical in determining the extent of potential competition. Larger 
export value means higher level of protection, while larger elasticity of substitution between 
EU27 and integrating Asia9 (or partners) exports entails greater potential for trade diversion. 
We also maintain that, given the nature of modern FTAs, deep integration could lead to the 
diversion of exports away from the EU in favor of integrating countries even in areas where 
protection is not high. Results from Lee and van der Mensbrugghe (2008), which are 
consistent with the rest of the literature, suggested that reductions in behind-the-border 
barriers generate results (Scenario 2 and 4) that go well beyond mere tariff effects. Such 
changes lead to important efficiency effects that will naturally spill over into higher 
productivity. But they will also likely have the effect of reinforcing production chains and 
demand systems in Asia itself, or with integrating partners. For example, Japan and 
Singapore essentially have zero tariffs on electronic products, a result of both the information 
and telecommunications technologies agreement and the very open nature of their 
manufacturing sectors. However, the 2002 Japan-Singapore Economic Partnership 
Agreement is a modern, “new age” agreement that brings down many other costs to bilateral 
trade and economic interaction besides tariffs. This could place the EU at a disadvantage 
despite zero tariffs. The same is true of the Singapore-US FTA:  if the story were just about 
tariffs, why were electronics multinationals so keen on the agreement? Tariffs were 
insignificant. Hence, while tariffs constitute an important part of commercial policy, there are 
many more that the EU needs to take into consideration.    
Moreover, the political economy of protection in the EU27 is somewhat more complicated 
than in the case of other major economies. Although the EU has a common commercial 
policy and negotiates as a group, the fact that 27 nations are represented suggests that the 
configuration of interest groups is more complex. In particular, national interests can be 
brought into economic arguments more easily than, say, would happen in the case of the 
US. For example, while the auto industry in Detroit may use political (e.g., national interest) 
and pseudo-economic (e.g., jobs) arguments in petitioning for protection, it will not be able to 
bring in the Michigan flag into the argument, or at least not convincingly. In Europe, however, 
the existence of nation-states within the economic space would permit this nationalistic 
dimension. And arguably this nationalistic dimension is picking up steam in Europe.   
Turning to the results, we note that, somewhat surprisingly, this disaggregated approach to 
potential trade diversion identified PRC as the pivotal market. Table 7 reveals that the 
greatest number of EU HS6 exports valued at over US$1 billion go to PRC, where seven 
product lines are identified. Moreover, trade protection in PRC tends to be much higher than 
in the case of other major key markets, reinforcing the significance of PRC in potential trade 
diversion. Japan is the second most important market with five entries, but its level of 
protection is so low as to preclude any Vinerian trade diversion in these areas. Still, as noted 
above, these areas should still be of concern to EU policymakers. 
Airplanes constitute the most important EU27 export to PRC and the second most important 
to India. No Asian market, of course, competes significantly with the EU in the same line as, 
for example, Airbus. However, Singapore (US$493 million), Thailand (US$27 million), 
Malaysia (US$13 million), and PRC (US$111 million) do have 880,240 exports. Moreover, 
                                                                                                                                                     
includes 3-digit-level protection.  We are not worried about HS 999999 as an average tariff in this area would 
be relatively meaningless, given the diversity of products covered.   
9 We used here the term adopted in the ADB Emerging Asian Regionalism study (ADB 2008).  We also chose a 
common set of countries, which are the most likely candidates in the regional integration scenarios, i.e., Japan, 
PRC, Korea, the ten ASEAN countries, and India. 
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the US is a fierce competitor with the EU in this area, potentially leading to trade diversion in 
the case of the FTAAP. Electronics and vehicle exports are also significant EU27 exports. 
While electronic products tend to face low levels of protection, vehicles face rather high 
levels in the Chinese and other markets. For example, Table A.1 shows that the Malaysian 
tariff on vehicles of 1,500-3,300cc is 103%, no doubt a reason why that sector did not make 
the US$1 billion cut-off. Japan, PRC, Korea, Malaysia, Thailand, and Singapore all report 
more than US$11 million in world exports in each of these vehicle product lines. Japanese 
exports, for example, in 870323 and 870324 combined, amount to US$80 billion. EU 
electronic exports also generally face competition across the board.  
Diamond exports to India reach US$7.4 billion, by far the largest EU27 HS6 exports to 
integrating Asia. They are also important in the case of Thailand, as shown in Table A.1.  
However, these are basically exports coming from Africa and re-exported through Europe. 
There are also no existing Asian competitors in this area. While Medicines (HS 300940) only 
break the US$1 billion cut-off in the Japanese market, they show up in the top 50 exports of 
all integrating Asian countries except India, with tariffs varying from 0 to 10% (Table A.1). 
Japan, Korea, Malaysia, PRC, Singapore, and Thailand are all significant exporters in this 
area with at least US$100 million. 
Regarding EU27 competitors, almost all EU member-states report vehicle exports, and given 
the unified market in the EU and fragmented trade, it is difficult to grasp where they add 
value. Still, the most important exporters in the reported trade data (world exports) are 
Germany (US$29 billion), Belgium (US$12 billion), and the UK (US$10 billion) for 870323; 
and Germany (US$32 billion), France (US$21 billion), and the UK (US$7 billion) for 870324. 
Many EU member-states are also part of the airplane production chain, but the main 
reporting exporters in this area are France (US$21 billion) and Germany (US$18 billion). All 
countries are essentially involved in the export of electronics and medicines. 
Thus, the potential trade diversion in the Asian markets due to regional integration is, 
perhaps, significant in a limited number of commodity groups, but these are important export 
categories. Moreover, they affect the most influential countries in determining the EU’s 
commercial policy.  
It would be interesting to give an example of potential trade diversion using this approach. 
Assuming there is an ASEAN+6 FTA, what would be the partial equilibrium effect on, say, 
vehicle exports (i.e., 870323 and 870324), which face relatively high tariffs in some Asian 
countries? EU exports to ASEAN+6 came to about US$11 billion in 2007. Assuming an 
elasticity of substitution across sources of vehicle exports of unity—in our view, a relatively 
conservative assumption—and  given existing tariff schedules, we calculated a trade 
diversion effect of US$1.53 billion. Now, these two HS6 exports were the third and fourth 
most important EU27 exports to the world in 2007 (beyond 999999-miscellaneous 
commodities and 300490-medicaments), with a value of US$77 billion. Hence, this estimate 
of trade diversion would come to only about 2% of the total. Still, trade diversion in these two 
products alone would almost be as much as in the entire Scenario 1 (i.e., tariff liberalization 
alone) of Lee and van der Mensbrugghe (2008), estimated at US$1.92 billion. In the highly-
competitive global automobile market, even a 2% drop would be significant. 
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Table 7: Top EU-27 Commodity Exports to Asian Markets 
  (Exports exceeding US$ 1 billion, HS 6-digit level)   







    
EU commodity exports to PRC (2006 tariff data)    
1  880240  Airplanes & other aircraft     5,083   3 
2  999999  Commodities not specified according to kind     3,692   NA* 
3  870324  Vehicles of a cylinder capacity >3,000cc     2,834   28 
4  740400  Copper waste & scrap     2,266   1.5 
5  870323  Vehicles for the transport of persons, 1,500-3,300cc     1,720   28 
6  854231  Electronic integrated  circuits     1,478   6.9* 
7  847989  Other machines & mechanical appliances     1,050   0 
    
EU commodity exports to India (2006 tariff data)    
1  710231  Diamonds, non-industrial, unworked     7.428   12.5 
2  880240  Airplanes & other aircraft     2,578   3 
3  999999  Commodities not specified according to kind     1,383   NA* 
    
EU commodity exports to Japan (2005 tariff data)    
1  870323  Vehicles for the transport of persons, 1,500-3,300cc     3,381   0 
2  300490  Medicaments      2,456   0 
3  870324  Vehicles of a cylinder capacity >3,000cc     2,099   0 
4  999999  Commodities not specified according to kind     1,809   NA* 
    
EU commodity exports to Malaysia (2001 tariff data)    
1  854231  Electronic integrated  circuits, processors & controllers     2,989   0.0* 
    
EU commodity exports to the Philippines (2007 tariff data)    
1  854231  Electronic integrated  circuits, processors & controllers     1,026   1.5* 
    
EU commodity exports to Korea (2007 tariff data)    
1  999999  Commodities not specified according to kind     1,549   NA* 
2  848620  Machines for the manufacture of semiconductor devices     1,367   1.5 
    
EU exports to Singapore (2007 tariff data)    
1  854239  Other Electronic integrated  circuits     1,243   0.0* 
2  854232  Electronic integrated  circuits, memories     1,202   0.0* 
3  841191  Parts of the turbo-jets/turbo-propellers     1,147   0 
4  271019  Petroleum oils & oils obtained from bituminous minerals      1,061   0 
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Notes: EU = European Union, Korea = Republic of Korea, PRC = People’s Republic of China. 
Tariff for HS999999 not meaningful, given diversity of components. 
WTO does not publish Viet Nam tariff, so this country has been excluded 
*denotes H6 6-digit data unavailable.  Estimations adopted from Naya and Plummer (2005). 
Sources:  From Appendix Table 1: EU Commodity Exports Data from UN COMTRADE; WTO Tariff Data. 
Investment diversion might also be an issue. Investment diversion takes place when 
multinational companies invest in an FTA in order to take advantage of barrier-free access 
within a given market. As protection in Asia is relatively low and multinationals invest in Asia 
mainly as part of a production-chain process10 rather than to “tariff hop,” this traditional 
interpretation of investment diversion is probably unimportant. However, if the rules of origin 
in a given Asian FTA are restrictive, this could give EU multinationals an added incentive to 
invest in Asia, rather than, for example, other EU countries (or other regions).   
In short, the disaggregated approach allowed us to identify a number of sectors that are of 
relevance in determining the “cost of disengagement” that the EU faces. While the outward-
oriented nature of Asian development has brought down tariffs to relatively low levels, 
several sectors will be affected by trade diversion, perhaps significantly so. More importantly, 
we argued that the behind-the-border areas that will be addressed in any Asian FTA could 
exacerbate the trade diversion effect where it exists, and cause a potential market shift away 
from the EU27 even in areas where border protection is negligible.    
4.  CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we have considered the potential economic implications of closer EU-Asian 
economic cooperation, the potential costs to the EU if it remains “disengaged” from the 
Asian integration process (and its accords with non-regional partners, such as the US), and 
the potential effects of multi-layered EU-Asian trade agreements.   
In terms of economic integration, Asia and the EU are key trading partners. Contrary to the 
US experience, export shares of the EU in Asian trade have been increasing in spite of the 
large increase in Asian intra-regional trade. The EU is the most important source of FDI for 
much of Asia.  Asia, on the other hand, constitutes a relatively small share of total EU trade, 
given the massive intra-regional bias of the single market. But the share has also been rising 
and, given Asia’s outward-oriented growth, this trend will likely continue.   
Our empirical review of CGE models showed small or trivial effects of several potential EU-
Asian accords, such as EU-India, EU-ASEAN and EU-Korea. In part, this is a result of 
relatively small trade shares, open markets, and restrictions in the models, particularly the 
exclusion of potential behind-the-border effects. We also presented two CGE models that 
estimated the potential negative effects of Asian/Asia-Pacific regional accords on the EU, 
and found small effects. Nevertheless, we argued that high-quality FTAs in Asia could 
potentially be quite detrimental to the EU, particularly in key sectors. We used a highly-
disaggregated (partial-equilibrium) approach to underscore this problem. The push toward a 
potential FTAAP, perhaps more likely in the aftermath of the November 2008 APEC Summit, 
could be particularly worrisome to the EU. Hence, it would make sense for the EU to be 
more aggressive in pursuing possible trade agreements with Asia.   
The efficiency effects of EU-Asian arrangements will obviously depend on the direction of 
commercial policy in the composite economies. There is no substitute for a strong, vibrant 
WTO. The EU and Asia need to do their best to ensure a successful conclusion to a deep 
Doha Development Agenda. A key advantage of the AEC, for example, will be its ability to 
play a more constructive role at the WTO. Recent failures to reach an accord have taken 
place essentially with very little input from ASEAN. Given that ASEAN and the EU are both 
                                                  
10 See, for example, ADB (2008). 
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generally in favor of a strong, comprehensive and effective WTO, joint cooperation at the 
WTO will be increasingly possible as ASEAN economic deepening advances. Success in 
this area will require significant political commitment, as certain interest groups opposed to 
trade liberalization will need to be confronted. 
Second, we have used the generic term “FTA” without bringing in the importance of the 
characteristics of these agreements. The drawbacks of the “spaghetti-bowl” effect are well 
known, particularly in terms of the complicated rules of origin that are included in these 
accords. We argued above that EU-Asia accords will likely take place—at least initially—on 
a bilateral basis, which would increase the size of the “spaghetti bowl.” But we do not feel 
that this is a reason for the EU to shun agreements with Asian countries, particularly given 
the current FTA trend. Rather, we suggest focusing on best practices in the agreement, an 
approach that we have called elsewhere as “turning spaghetti into lasagna” (Plummer 2007).  
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APPENDIX 














A.  Top 15 EU commodity exports to PRC (2006 tariff data)     
1  880240  Airplanes & other aircraft     5,083.00  3 
2  999999  Commodities not specified according to kind     3,692.00  NA* 
3  870324  Vehicles of a cylinder capacity >3,000cc     2,834.00  28 
4  740400  Copper waste & scrap     2,266.00  1.5 
5  870323  Vehicles for the transport of persons, 1,500-3,300cc     1,720.00  28 
6  854231  Electronic integrated  circuits     1,478.00  6.9 
7  847989  Other machines & mechanical appliances     1,050.00  0 
8 853890  Machine  Parts     957.40   7 
9 300490  Medicaments     932.10   3.7 
10  851770  Parts of telephone sets     844.70   6.9* 
11 850440  Static  converters     776,10   5.3 
12  870899  Other parts & accessories for the motor vehicles      773.10   14.1 
13  853710  Boards, panels, & other bases for control of electricity     744.60   6.1 
14  870840  Gear boxes & parts thereof, of the motor vehicles     731.90   10.1 
15  870829  Parts & accessories of bodies of the motor vehicles     699.30   10.3 
        
B.  Top 15 EU commodity exports to India (2006 tariff data)     
1 710231  Diamonds,  non-industrial,  unworked     7,428.00  12.5 
2  880240  Airplanes & other aircraft     2,578.00  3 
3  999999  Commodities not specified according to kind     1,383.00  NA* 
4  851770  Parts of telephone sets     547.50   15.1 
5  720851  Flat-rolled products of iron/non-alloy steel     446.40   5 
6  710239  Diamonds, non-industrial other than unworked     418.40   12.5 
7  720421  Waste & scrap of stainless steel     407.70   5 
8 852990 
Other parts suitable for apparatus of headings 85.25 to 
85.28     303.20   4.2 
9  848340  Gears&gearing; ball/roller screws; other speed changers     296.80   12.5 
10  847989  Other machines & mechanical appliances     282.00   6.6 
11  870899  Other parts & accessories for motor vehicles     274.00   12.5 
12  848180  Taps, cocks, valves & similar appliances      268.80   12.5 
13 880230 
Airplanes&other aircraft of weight >2,000kg but not 
>15,000kg     265.30   3 
14  841191  Parts of the turbo-jets/turbo-propellers of 8411.11-8411.22     257.10   6.3 
15  841199  Parts of the other gas turbines of 8411.81 & 8411.82     238.60   12.5 
        














C.  Top 10 EU commodity exports to Indonesia (2006 tariff data)     
1 890610  Warships     381.80   0 
2  999999  Commodities not specified according to kind     331.80   NA* 
3  851770  Parts of telephone sets     320.60   3.3* 
4  880240  Airplanes & other aircraft     240.00   0 
5  851761  Base stations for transmission/reception of voice     186.10   3.3* 
6  854239  Other Electronic integrated  circuits     146.10   NA* 
7 851762 
Machines for the reception, conversion & transmission of 
voice       90.47   3.3* 
8 300490  Medicaments       83.29   4.8 
9  470710  Recovered (waste & scrap) unbleached kraft paper       81.61   7.5 
10  40210  Milk in powder/granules/other solid form       77.85   5 
        
D.  Top 15 EU commodity exports to Japan (2005 tariff data)     
1  870323  Vehicles for the transport of persons, 1,500-3,300cc     3,381.00  0 
2 300490  Medicaments       2,456.00  0 
3  870324  Vehicles of a cylinder capacity >3,000cc     2,099.00  0 
4  999999  Commodities not specified according to kind     1,809.00  NA* 
5  20329  Meat of swine, frozen     905.50   2.2 
6  440710  Wood sawn/chipped length wise     816.70   1.2 
7  293399  Heterocyclic comps. with nitrogen hetero-atom(s)     768.80   3.2 
8  840820  Compression-ignition internal combustion piston engines     660.50   0 
9  870899  Other parts & accessories for the motor vehicles     634.10   0 
10  220421  Wine other than sparkling wine of fresh grapes     593.90   NA* 
11 900130  Contact  lenses     514.40   0 
12  848620  Machines for the manufacture of semiconductor devices     511.00   0.0 
13 420231 
Articles carried in the pocket/the handbag, 
leather/composition     459.50   13 
14  293339  Heterocyclic comps. containing an unfused pyridine ring     449.10   1 
15 902190 
Appliances worn/carried, to compensate for a 
defect/disability     433.50   0 
        
E.  Top 15 EU commodity exports to Malaysia (2001 tariff data)     
1  854231  Electronic integrated  circuits, processors & controllers     2,989.00  0.0 
2  880240  Airplanes & other aircraft     759.60   0 
3  854239  Other Electronic integrated  circuits     729.30   0.0 
4  854232  Electronic integrated  circuits, memories     582.90   0.0 
5  847330  Parts & accessories of the machines of heading 84.71     579.00   0 
6  999999  Commodities not specified according to kind     412.90   NA* 
7 854129  Transistors  (excl.  photosensitive transistors)     205.40   0 
8  760200  Aluminium waste & scrap     189.70   0 














9 300490  Medicaments       177.80   0 
10  854140  Photosensitive semiconductor devices     164.60   0 
11  851770  Parts of telephone sets     156.20   20.0* 
12  847989  Other machines & mechanical appliances     123.80   0.6 
13  870323  Vehicles for the transport of persons, 1,500-3,300cc     114.90   103 
14  851761  Base stations for transmission/reception of voice     105.90   20.0* 
15  848180  Taps, cocks, valves & similar appliances        71.84   8.1 
        
F.  Top 15 EU commodity exports to the Philippines (2007 tariff data)     
1  854231  Electronic integrated  circuits, processors & controllers     1,026.00  1.5* 
2  880240  Airplanes & other aircraft     483.50   3 
3  854239  Other Electronic integrated  circuits     385.40   3.0* 
4 300490  Medicaments       166.60   4.7 
5  999999  Commodities not specified according to kind     107.50   NA* 
6  854290  Parts of electronic integrated  circuits     102.00   0 
7  190110  Preparations for infant use, put up for RS       83.98   7 
8 854129  Transistors         60.92   0 
9  730810  Bridges & bridge-sections of iron/steel       59.30   6.5 
10  854232  Electronic integrated  circuits, memories       54.30   3.0* 
11  847330  Parts & accessories of the machines of heading 84.71       53.11   0 
12 851762 
Machines for the reception, conversion & transmission of 
voice       47.24   0.0* 
13  851770  Parts of telephone sets       46.94   5.5* 
14  847990  Parts of Machines & mechanical appliances       41.39   0.8 
15  847989  Other machines & mechanical appliances       37.76   0.8 
        
G.  Top 15 EU commodity exports to Korea (2007 tariff data)     
1  999999  Commodities not specified according to kind     1,549.00  NA* 
2  848620  Machines for the manufacture of semiconductor devices     1,367.00  1.5 
3 300490  Medicaments       788.90   8 
4  870324  Vehicles of a cylinder capacity >3,000cc     601.50   8 
5  870323  Vehicles for the transport of persons, 1,500-3,300cc     485.00   8 
6  720421  Waste & scrap of stainless steel     478.90   0 
7  284420  Uranium enriched; plutonium & its compounds     454.00   0 
8 840999 
Parts for use solely/principally with the engines of 
84.07/84.08     420.20   7.6 
9  20329  Meat of swine, frozen     356.10   25 
10  847989  Other machines & mechanical appliances     325.70   8 
11  854231  Electronic integrated  circuits, processors & controllers     284.50   0 
12 220830  Whiskies     279.70   20 
13  870899  Other parts & accessories for the motor vehicles     277.00   8 














14  880240  Airplanes & other aircraft     275.50   0 
15  848180  Taps, cocks, valves & similar appliances      253.60   8 
        
H.  Top 15 EU exports to Singapore (2007 tariff data)     
1  854239  Other Electronic integrated  circuits     1,243.00  0.0* 
2  854232  Electronic integrated  circuits, memories     1,202.00  0.0* 
3  841191  Parts of the turbo-jets/turbo-propellers     1,147.00  0 
4  271019  Petroleum oils & oils obtained from bituminous minerals      1,061.00  0 
5  999999  Commodities not specified according to kind     831.10   NA* 
6  854231  Electronic integrated  circuits     593.90   0.0* 
7 300490  Medicaments       420.30   0 
8 854150  Semiconductor  devices     408.40   0 
9  880240  Airplanes & other aircraft     359.60   0 
10 220830  Whiskies     315.20   0 
11  848620  Machines for the manufacture of semiconductor devices     307.70   0.0* 
12  870323  Vehicles for the transport of persons, 1,500-3,300cc     300.20   0 
13  220820  Spirits obtained by distilling grape wine/grape marc     299.50   0 
14  847330  Parts & accessories of the machines of heading 84.71     270.20   0 
15 840999 
Parts for use solely/principally with the engines of 
84.07/84.08     253.20   0 
        
I. Top 15 EU commodity exports to Thailand (2006 Tariff data)     
1  999999  Commodities not specified according to kind     627.00   NA* 
2  880240  Airplanes & other aircraft     276.20   1 
3  854231  Electronic integrated  circuits, processors & controllers     240.20   NA* 
4 300490  Medicaments       236.60   10 
5  854239  Other Electronic integrated  circuits     233.40   NA* 
6 710231  Diamonds,  non-industrial,  unworked     230.80   0 
7  847330  Parts & accessories of machines     137.00   0 
8  710239  Diamonds, non-industrial other than unworked     124.80   0 
9  880260  Spacecraft (incl. satellites)     115.30   5 
10  870899  Other parts & accessories for motor vehicles       95.71   30 
11  870323  Vehicles for the transport of persons, 1,500-3,300cc       95.53   56.7 
12  382490  Chemical products & preparations       83.07   5 
13  848180  Taps, cocks, valves & similar appliances       76.45   10 
14 220830  Whiskies       76.06   NA* 
15  847989  Other machines & mechanical appliances       74.54   1 
Notes:  tariff for HS999999 not meaningful, given diversity of components. 
WTO does not publish Viet Nam tariff, so this country has been excluded. 
*denotes H6 6-digit data unavailable.  Estimations adopted from Naya and Plummer (2005). 
Sources:  EU Commodity Exports Data from UN COMTRADE; WTO Tariff Data. 
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